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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 20040702-CA

vs.
HOWARD RAYMOND RICE,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of a clandestine drug laboratory, a
first degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37d-4, -5(l)(d)-(f) (West 2004),
and unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2005), in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Iron

County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding.1 This Court has jurisdiction
of this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-3 (2)(j) (West 2004).
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Was the evidence sufficient to prove that defendant was not entrapped where
defendant approached the confidential informant for a methamphetamine precursor and
1

Because no changes to code sections relevant to the issues in this case have been
made since the time the offenses were committed, the State cites to the latest edition of
the code.

thereafter disregarded police admonitions by acting illegally without official authorization?
When reviewing a jury verdict, this court views all the facts and reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Torres, 2000 UT 100, f
2, 16 P.3d 1242, 1243. Unless the evidence viewed in such a light establishes beyond a
reasonable doubt that Rice was entrapped, the Court must affirm the conviction. State v.
Martinez, 848 P.2d 702,706 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993).2
STATUTES
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A:
§ 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2005);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37d-4 (West 2004);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37d-5 (West 2004);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (West).
UTAH CODE ANN.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with possession of a clandestine drug
laboratory, a first degree felony (count 1); unlawful possession of a precursor chemical (red
phosphorous), a second degree felony (count 2); and unlawful possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony (count 3). R2-1. Defendant moved to

2

Defendant asserts that the issue of entrapment was preserved by his submission
of an entrapment instruction. Aplt. Br. at 1 (citing R122). Because defendant does not
challenge the instruction, but instead claims the evidence was insufficient to prove that he
was not entrapped, a jury instruction, without more, is insufficient to preserve his claim.
See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ff 16-18, 10 P.3d 346 (holding challenge to
sufficiency of evidence must be preserved in the trial court). However, at the close of the
State's case-in-chief, defendant made a cursory motion for a directed verdict as to all
three counts, which the trial court denied. R198:242-43, 250. Consequently, the claim is
preserved, albeit marginally. See Aple. Br. at p.9 n.4.
2

dismiss the charges on the ground that he was entrapped. R75-73. The court denied the
motion. R95-94. A jury found defendant guilty of all charges. R162-61. Following the
verdict, defendant moved to merge count 2 with count 1. R 199:42-43. The court granted the
motion. R 199:43. The trial court sentenced defendant to a statutory five-year-to-life term
for operating a clandestine drug lab and a statutory zero-to-five-year term for unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, the sentences to run concurrently. Rl 87-85. Defendant
timely appealed. R193. The Utah Supreme Court poured the case over to this Court. R194.
STATEMENT OF FACTS3
Michael Patrick met defendant for the first time on or before March 12, 2003, at
Patrick's neighbor's house in Hamilton Park. R198:65-69. Defendant approached Patrick
and asked him if he could get some red phosphorus from which defendant would make some
methamphetamine. R198:59-60, 69-70. Although he had never met defendant, Patrick
surmised that defendant probably approached him for the methamphetamine precursor
because Patrick's appearance—longer hair, missing teeth—suggested that he might be
associated with the methamphetamine culture. R198:70,125. Patrick replied that he "might
be able to [get some red phosphorus]" and that "[he']d see what [he] could do." R198:70-71.
Patrick had worked as a confidential informant for the Iron County Narcotics Task
Force. R198:66, 176-77. On the day defendant approached him, Patrick called his
supervising officer, Cedar City Police Sergeant Darin Adams, reported his encounter with

3

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v.
Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
3

defendant, and asked for instructions on how to proceed. R198:70-72,174,176. Following
Adams' instructions, Patrick called defendant and told him that he would be able to provide
the red phosphorous, if defendant was still interested. R198:72, 177. Defendant answered
affirmatively and stated that if Patrick could get him some of the red phosphorus he would
make some methamphetamine with it. R198:72-73.
Patrick immediately called Sergeant Adams, who directed him to arrange a meeting
with defendant in the Wal-Mart parking lot. R198:73, 178. A day or two later, Patrick
informed defendant of these arrangements. R198:73. The next evening, March 17, 2003,
Sergeant Adams placed a bag containing 3/4 pound of red phosphorus in a garbage can at
Patrick's house. R198:73-74, 178, 192. Two officers were assigned to keep constant
surveillance to make sure the can was not tampered with. R198:178. An electronic listening
device was hidden in Patrick's car. R198:74-75,178. Patrick then called defendant and told
defendant to meet him in the parking lot. R198:74.
Earlier on March 17, sometime before 5:00 p.m., defendant had approached his
probation officer, Todd Mitchell, and proposed that defendant could set up one Jeff
Campbell, a known methamphetamine cook, by offering Campbell a precursor to produce
methamphetamine. R198:227, 231, 233. Mitchell immediately contacted Iron County
Sheriff's Officer Dale Schlosser, who joined defendant and Mitchell to discuss defendant's
proposal. R198:2:06-07,209-10,232. In this meeting, defendant proposed the same plan to
Officer Schlosser, but he said he did not yet know the name of a supplier of the precursor.
R198:209. Officer Schlosser told defendant that the Sheriffs Office could not act unless
4

defendant provided a name. Id. Officer Schlosser did not authorize defendant to purchase
any precursor chemicals or to work for the Task Force: defendant was not asked to fill out
the relevant paperwork preliminary to being authorized as a confidential informant; he was
"absolutely not" authorized to work for the Task Force as a confidential informant on May
17,2003; and he was not authorized to make any controlled buy. R198:185,210-13. Rather,
because Officer Schlosser knew that defendant would receive a controlled delivery later that
day through Patrick, acting as a confidential informant, he merely listened to defendant.
R198:210. At about 5:15 pm, after he had left Mitchell's office, defendant called Mitchell
and asked to clarify on what defendant could do. R198:233. Mitchell again told defendant
"specifically he couldn' t do anything without calling me first or calling [Officer Schlosser]."
Id. Notwithstanding that admonition and that he had not been authorized as a confidential
informant, defendant failed to disclose that he intended to buy red phosphorous and produce
methamphetamine later that very day. R198:223,233-34. He merely indicated he would try
to find out the supplier's name. R198:223.
Defendant met Patrick, as planned, and they drove to Patrick's house. R198:75,178.
En route, defendant bragged about his ability to run and simultaneously disguise his
methamphetamine lab so effectively that his probation officers had been unaware of it during
their visits to his home. R74-76. Defendant also named some of the chemicals he used to
make methamphetamine—ephedrine, red phosphorus, iodine—and stated that he could
usually produce it in a single night. R198:76, 178-79. After they retrieved the red
phosphorus from the garbage can, defendant said he would use it to cook "a batch" and, in
5

exchange, produce an "8-ball"—three and one-half grams—of methamphetamine, which
Patrick could pick up at defendant's work place the next day. R198:76-78, 178. Sergeant
Adams confirmed hearing defendant's conversation with Patrick with the listening device.
R198:179,181. Patrick and defendant then drove back to the Wal-Mart parking lot, where,
after defendant left, Patrick met with Sergeant Adams. R.198:78, 178, 81.
Defendant was tracked in his vehicle to his residence, where he was arrested.
R198:181-82, 203, 213. Voluntarily waiving his Miranda rights, defendant admitted to
Sergeant Adams that he accompanied Patrick to retrieve the red phosphorus, but that he
assembled "a lab" inside his house to "set someone else up." R198:203-04. Police executed
a search warrant for defendant's home that night and the next day. R198:100-01,117. There
they found an operational methamphetamine lab, evidenced by approximately 30 items used
in and arranged for the manufacture of methamphetamine: flares with striker caps (which
contain red phosphorus), glassware in the form of a separatory funnel, solvents, acids, bases,
unknown liquids, heating elements, coffee filters, tubing with a white residue, a pH kit,
pseudoephedrine tablets, an empty can of denatured alcohol, lye, and hydrochloric acid.
R198-.107-13, 116-21, 124-31, 133-39, 143-51, 159-61, 164-70, 188-89, 214-16; State's
Exhibits 3, 5-7, 10, 13, 14, 18, 20, 23, 27-32, 36; R166-164 (Addendum B). Among these
items were two precursors of methamphetamine—red phosphorus (hidden in a filmcannister)
and pseudoephedrine in liquid form—and methamphetamine in liquid form. R198:125-28,
133-38,164-65,170; State's Ex. 18, 27-30, 32. Police also found evidence of consumption
of controlled substances, including tin foil containing burnt residue, a spoon with residue,

6

rolling papers, a syringe, a butane fuel cannister, and cotton balls. R198:l 10-15,118,122,
124,129; State's Exhibits 4, 8, 9,12,15,17,19, 22; R166-165. They also found controlled
substances, including methamphetamine. R198:169; State's Exhibits 16; R166. These items
were found primarily in the kitchen, but also throughout the house. R107, 114, 116, 118,
119, 126, 130-31, 143, 152, 221. Defendant's house measured 57 feet from another
residence. R198:202.
Defendant claimed that all of his actions were solely to entice one Jeff Campbell to
buy red phosphorus to cook methamphetamine, which he hoped would lead to Campbell's
arrest. R256-60. He claimed on direct examination that Mitchell told him to "just do the
deal and leave the legal aspects of the deal up to him." R 198:260. He claimed that most of
the items found in his home were just household supplies. R198:263-64. Other, more
incriminating items, like red phosphorus and pseudoephedrine, were intended to make his
methamphetamine lab appear genuine, so as to lure Campbell to cook the controlled
substance in his home. R198:264-65. He claimed that he left the Task Force's office with
their permission to "cross the line between right and wrong." R198:268.
On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that Officer Schlosser did not
authorize him to act as a confidential informant. R198:275. He acknowledged that Mitchell
told him "not to do anything." R198:279,286. He acknowledged that when he unexpectedly
received the red phosphorus that he "proceeded without authorization." R298:279-80,286.
Although he claimed that there were not enough parts of a lab in his house to cook
methamphetamine,

when

confronted

with

7

the

fact

that

tested,

finished

product—methamphetamine—was found in his house, defendant, without further
explanation, acquiesced in the criminal lab's report. R198:280-81; State's Ex. 32.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant was not entrapped into buying red phosphorous from a police informant,
but merely afforded an opportunity to commit the offenses. Not only did the police act
minimally through the confidential informant, but defendant also initiated and thereafter
implemented the illegal actions that led to his arrest and convictions. Though defendant did
speak with the police about the possibility of his becoming a confidential informant, he was
never authorized to act as such and he was repeatedly advised by two police officers to not
act in any way without their authorization. Nevertheless, defendant still proceeded to buy
red phosphorus. Utah cases dealing with the defense of entrapment have never recognized
it in circumstances similar to this case and have even refused to find it in a number of cases
where the illegal transaction was proposed by law enforcement or a person known to the
defendant.
ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE POLICE DID NOT ENTRAP
DEFENDANT INTO POSSESSING BOTH METHAMPHETAMINE
AND A METHAMPHETAMINE LABORATORY
Defendant does not argue that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of
possession of a clandestine drug laboratory or of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance. Defendant asserts only that the officers' failure to inform him of their knowledge
of the planned transfer of red phosphorus "created a substantial risk that the offense would
8

be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it" by "allow [ing] him to walk into a
trap." Aplt. Br. at 6. Offering minimal discussion and no relevant authority, defendant
merely asserts repeatedly that police conduct was "clear[ly]" below proper standards and
"[cjommon feelings." Id. at 7-8.
"To prove the defense of entrapment, the evidence must be sufficient to raise 'a
reasonable doubt that [the defendant] freely and voluntarily committed the offense.'" State
v. 7brray,2000UT 100,18,16P.3d 1242 (quoting State v. Udell,72$P2d 131,132 (Utah)).
The appellate court views the evidence of entrapment "in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict." Udell, 728 P.2d at 132.
The defense of entrapment is set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (West 2004).
That section provides as follows:
It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or a person directed by or acting in
cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to
obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise
ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to
commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.

Id. at §76-2-303(1).
In State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court held that the
determination of entrapment under the statute must be made using an objective standard.
Taylor, 599 P.2d at 499-500. The objective standard "focuses solely on police conduct,
rather than on the defendant's predisposition to commit a crime." Torres, 2000 UT 100, f
8 (citing Taylor, 599 P.2d at 500). Thus, "[i]f the police conduct creates a substantial risk
9

that an otherwise law abiding person would be induced to commit a crime, entrapment has
occurred

" State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 318 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted).

See also State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (entrapment defense
available where "an ordinary person in defendant's situation would be induced to commit
crime").
Applying the objective standard, the Utah Supreme Court has identified two general
categories of entrapment situations: (1 inducement "based on improper police conduct" and
(2) inducement "based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close personal friendship, or offers of
inordinate sums of money." Torres, 2000 UT 100, f 9 (citations omitted). Defendant
repeatedly alleges only the former. Aplt. Br. at 6-8.
Cases in this state finding entrapment due to improper police conduct have required
either persistent and repeated police pressure to commit an offense or at very least a total lack
of evidence suggesting that the defendant would have engaged in the activity absent that
pressure. See State v. Sprague, 680 P.2d 404, 406 (Utah 1984) (undercover officer
approached the defendant three times without reason to believe that he would buy or sell
drugs); State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Utah 1980) (officer contacted defendant
to sell marijuana at least five times over the course of several weeks).
Police conduct in this case was minimal, demonstrably different from that in Sprague
and Kourbelas, and not improper. After hearing from Patrick that defendant sought to obtain
red phosphorus, Sergeant Adams told Patrick, who only at that point began to act as a
confidential informant, to tell defendant that the red phosphorus could be supplied. R198:70-

10

72, 174, 176-77. After hearing from Patrick of defendant's continued interest, Sergeant
Adams supplied the red phosphorus. R198:73-74, 178, 192. After Patrick arranged a
meeting, defendant and he retrieved the red phosphorus. R198:74-78. After tracking
defendant to his residence, the police arrested him. R198:181-82, 203, 213. Such minimal
police involvement in defendant's actions hardly constitutes entrapment. Sprague, 680
P.2dat 406; Kourbelas, 621 P.2d at 1240.
Nevertheless, defendant asserts that "the Task Force did not inform [him that] it was
working against him" "using an informant and a proposed transaction" about which
"[defendant] himself had approached the Task Force... [while] seeking to work/br the Task
Force." Aplt. Br. at 6. Consequently, he argues, the Task Force "created a substantial risk
that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it." Id. (citing
section 76-2-303(1)). This conduct, defendant argues, "'falls below standards to which
common feelings respond for the proper use of governmental power." Aplt. Br. at 7 (quoting
State v. Byrns, 911 P.2d 981,988 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), quoting State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d at
500)).
This argument is without merit.

In Byrns, this Court held that Byrns was not

entrapped because "defendant demonstrated] his willingness and eagerness" to set up a
methamphetamine lab." Byrns, 911 P.2d at 988. Defendant cites no other case relative to
the fact situation in this case. Thus, defendant's argument is unsupported by authority.
More importantly, defendant's argument neglects crucial facts. The police targeted
defendant because he initiated the sequence of events that led to his arrest when he

11

approached Patrick to obtain a precursor for methamphetamine manufacture. R198:69-72,
174,176. Defendant cites no authority to support an argument that his subsequent offer to
assist the police in a sting of his own creation supplanted reasonable police action or imposed
a duty on police to warn him of the consequences of illegal activity that he had previously
initiated. Defendant's argument becomes even more groundless where defendant failed to
inform the police of his planned activities, was repeatedly cautioned not to act without
authorization, and acknowledged that he was never authorized to act as a confidential
informant. R198:185, 210-13, 223, 233. On this evidence, no reasonable juror would have
found that the police induced defendant to go forward with actions that would otherwise be
illegal. Stated differently, it was not police misconduct that resulted in defendant's arrest,
but the inherent danger in defendant's angling to "burn" a fellow methamphetamine cook.
Defendant was simply, justly "hoist by his own petar[d]." WTLLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET
Act III Scene iv.
The objective standard focuses on police conduct.

"Entrapment however, has not

occurred if a law enforcement officer merely affords a person an opportunity to commit the
offense." Id. (citation omitted). "'[W]here it is known or suspected that a person is engaged
in criminal activities, or is desiring to do so, it is not an entrapment to provide an opportunity
for such person to carry out his criminal intentions."' Torres, 2000 UT 100, ff 12, 14
(rejecting claim of entrapment where the defendant "initiated and continued to pursue contact
with police informant") (quoting State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah 1975)).
Torres presents a factual scenario dispositive of defendant's claim of entrapment.

12

Torres came to the confidential informant's residence to discuss a drug transaction with
another individual residing there. Torres, 2000 UT 100, f 2. The confidential informant
called an undercover agent and told him that defendant was a "big mover of drugs." Id.
Within a month after they initially met, the confidential informant visited defendant at his
home six times. Id. atf3.

During each visit, the confidential informant and Torres spoke

about purchasing and transporting drugs. Id. Shortly afterward, the confidential informant
tried to buy heroin from Torres. Id. at f 4. When Torres was unable to obtain the heroin, a
new deal was arranged for the sale of a pound of methamphetamine. Id. When Torres and
his cohorts delivered the methamphetamine, he was arrested. Id. at f 6.
The Utah Supreme Court rejected Torres' argument that his entrapment was based on
"deception" that was "inherently unfair." Id. at f 13. The court recognized that because
drug dealing is "by its very nature secretive," "there is always an element of deception in
entrapment cases."

Id.

The court nevertheless concluded, "because of defendant's

independent and persistent attempts [to supply illegal drugs], we find that his actions were
'freely and voluntarily committed,' and thus were not induced by the informant's conduct."
Id. at f 14. (citation omitted). "Instead, the informant's conduct merely provided defendant
an opportunity to carry out his criminal intentions." Id. "Therefore, the evidence of
entrapment did not create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt as a matter of law
. . . . " Id.
Here, as in Torres, the police merely afforded defendant the opportunity to carry out
his criminal intentions where he evidently had an independent desire "to engag[e] in criminal

13

activities." Torres, 2000 UT 100, f 14. Defendant acknowledged that he approached Patrick
and made an unsolicited request to obtain red phosphorus, a chemical precursor to
methamphetamine. R198:59-60,69-70. See Aplt. Br. at 3. Patrick responded to defendant's
request a few days later, informing defendant that he could obtain the red phosphorus, if
defendant was still interested. R198:72. Defendant answered affirmatively and stated that
if Patrick could get him some red phosphorus he would make some methamphetamine with
it. R 198:72-73. A day or two later, defendant met Patrick, and together they retrieved the
red phosphorus from Patrick's garbage can. R198:75-76. En route to Patrick's house,
defendant bragged about how effectively he disguised his methamphetamine lab. R74-76.
After defendant was arrested, police found an operational methamphetamine lab,
methamphetamine

precursors—red

phosphorus

and

pseudoephedrine—and

methamphetamine in liquid and powder form in defendant's house. R198:126-28,133-38,
164-66, 170, 188-89, 214-16; State's Ex. 16, 18, 27-30, 32. Apart from defendant's
undisputed initiation of and participation in the arrangement to obtain red phosphorus, the
massiveness of the evidence found in defendant's home establishes that defendant was
manufacturing methamphetamine long before he was allegedly "trap[ped]" by police into
setting up another individual.
Finally, Utah courts have never expanded the defense of entrapment to include
circumstances similar to this case and have even refused to apply it to circumstances in
which, in contradistinction to the facts of this case, officers or friends of the defendant have
proposed the illegal action. See J.D.W., 910 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (no

14

entrapment as a matter of law where police officer approached randomly targeted juvenile
with offer to sell marijuana); State v. Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (no
entrapment where police used friend of defendant to propose a marijuana sale); State
v.Wynia, 754 P.2d 667, 668-70 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (no entrapment where undercover
female officer encountered the defendant in a social setting, initiated request for contraband,
and had no prior suspicion of his disposition to sell marijuana).
In sum, viewed most favorably to the jury's verdict, this evidence was more than
sufficient to show that defendant was independently willing and eager to commit the offenses
and that he was not entrapped.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's
convictions be affirmed.

15

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court ofAppeals, 2005 UT 18,
f 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the
bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 1982).
In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral argument."
Utah R. App. P. 29(a).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /<&

day of November, 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

KENNETH* A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee
were mailed, postage prepaid, to Randle C. Allen, Barnes & Allen, LLP, attorneys for
defendant, Depot Plaza, 415 N. Main, Suite 303, Cedar City, UT 84720, this / ^
November, 2005.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

UTAH-CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT

§ 58-37-8,

Prohibited acts—Penalties

(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled of counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent,
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person 'participates, directs, or engages in conduct which
results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a,
37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate
occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more persons with
respect,to whom the person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor,
or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance
analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a
second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty
o£ a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of
a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty
of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third
degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection
(l)(a)(ii) or (iii) maj be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term
as provided by law, but-if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in
Section 76-10-501 was' used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his
immediate possession during the commission or imfurtherance of the offense,
the"" court shall additionally sentence the person Convicted for a term of one
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not^to exceed
five years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not
lesslthan seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of
<the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for
probation.

(2) Prohibited facts B—Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance^ analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription oi order, direcriy from a practitioner
while acting "in the course of his professional practice, or'as otherwise
authorized by this chapter;'
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control ot any building,
room, tenement/ vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and
intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations;
or
i (in) forfany person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second
degree felony; j
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is
more than 16 ounces, but less than1 100 pounds, or a controlled substance
analog, is guilty of a/third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin
from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less
than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(xz) ,Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled
substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana^ is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A1 misdemeanor, and
upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree
felony,.
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the
exterioi boundaries of property occupied by any I correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the ^onviction^ is with respect to controlled substances as
listed in:
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as provided by law, and:r
U (A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term
of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
\ (B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for 'an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to, imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally
sentence the person convicted to, a term of six months to run consecutively
and not concurrently.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
'(i}f/on a first conviction, guilty of a class B^ misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor;* and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a, third degree felony.

.offense not amounting tp a violation of Section 76-5-207;
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentioually haying in
his body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and
(iij) operates a motor, vehicle -as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601
-or the death of anothen
(3) Prohibited acts C—Penalties;
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally^
fi (i) to use krthe course of the-manufacturer distribution of a controlled
s u b s t a n c e ^ license number" which'is fictitious/revoked, suspended, or
issued to another person or, for >tfle- purpose of obtaining-& controlled
substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, .apothecary, physician*, dentist, veterinarian; or.othes authorized person;
(n) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure
the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense
to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or
to procure the .administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the, person to disclose his receiving any controlled
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the
use of a false name or addressp
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter ^any prescription for
written order issued or written under the^ terms of this chapter;» or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch* die, plate, stone, or Qther
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, tfade name,
or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of
any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so a§ to, render
any drug a counterfeit controlled substance^
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty pi a third
degree felony*(4) Prohibited acts D—Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under
this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act> or'under
Title 58, Chapter 37b,r Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if
the trier of fact finds the act is committed4
(l) in a public or pnvate elementary* or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
(n) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution
or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
^ (iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure
or grounds which are, at the time of the act,' being nsed for an activity
sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i)
and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in or. on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section
76-10-501;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena^theater, movie
house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
1
" (viiiy in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet^of any structure! facility, or grounds included in
Subsections (4j((a)(i) thrdugh (vm);

w AII uic jLiiuneaiaie presence ot a person younger than 18 years oi^ age,
regardless of where the act occurs; or
(xi)JortHe purpose of facilitating; arranging, or causing the transport,
delivery, 6r distributioiicbfv^n substance in" violation of'this section to ah
inmate or on the ground's of aiiy correctional facility as defined iii Section
76-8-3 If.3.
'
'
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term»of not less than five* years* if the
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would
have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person
convicted under Subsection (2)(g) or this Subsection (4) is guilty of one
degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi):
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the
person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for 'an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person
who, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an
offense, directly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to commit a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi).
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the
time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the
actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as
described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act
occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B
misdemeanor.
(6)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another slate, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another
state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the
person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or
substances.
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the^ substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:

(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses ari imitation controlled substance for use as
a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the
for;dinaiy course of professional practice or research; or
(b) n any law-enforcement officer acting in tne course and legitimate scope
of his employment.
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the'remainder of this chapter shall
be 'given effect without the invalid provision or application]

CLANDESTINE DRUG LAB ACT

§ 5 8 - 3 7 d - 4 . Prohibited acts—Second degree felony
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally:
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a
clandestine laboratory operation;
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a
clandestine laboratory operation;
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical,, laboratory
equipment, or laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to
believe it will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation;
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Utah Controlled Substance Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under that act,
loiowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the material distributed
or received will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation;
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory
operation;
(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or manufacture a controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized under Title 58,
Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act;
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the
intent to distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or conveying the controlled or counterfeit substance or by any other person regardless
of whether the final destination for the distribution is within this state or any
other location; or
(h) engage in compounding, synthesis, concentration, purification, separation, extraction, or other physical or chemical processing of any substance,
including a controlled substance precursor, or the packaging, repackaging,
labeling, or relabeling of a container holding a substance that is a product of
any of these activities, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the
substance is a product of any of these activities and will be used in the illegal
manufacture of specified controlled substances.
(2) A person who violates" any provision of Subsection (1) is guilty of a second
degree felony.

§ 58—37d~5. Prohibited acts—First degree felony
(1) A person who violates Subsection 5 8-3 7d-4(l)(a), (b), (e), (f), or (h) is
guilty of a first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the
following conditions occurred in conjunction with that violation:
(a) possession of a firearm;
(b)4 use of a booby trap;
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or danger*,
ous material or while transporting or causing to be transported materials in
furthefaiice of a clandestine laboratory ^operation, there was created a substantial risk to human health >pv safety or a danger to the environmental) intended laboratory operation was to take place f oi\ did, takq place
^ithin 500 feet of a residence,"plice of business, church, or schools
(e) clandestine^ laboratory operation actually 'produced, any amount1 of: a.
specified controlled^substance; or
h (f) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the fprpductiorf 'of
cobaihe base or methamphetamine base.
(2) If the trier of fact finds that two or more of the conditions' listed* in
Subsectfbris^(iy(a) through (f) of this section occurred in conjunction with the
violation, at sentencing for the first degree felony:
(a) probation shall hot be granted:
(b) the execution or ^imposition or seiitence snail not be suspended; and
(c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower category of offense^
Laws 1992, c. 156, § 5; Laws 1997, c. 64, § 12! eff May 5, 1997; Laws 1W8, c 65, §"1,
eff May 4, 1998, Laws 2000, a 187, § 1, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2003, c J15, § 3, efL
May 5, 2003.

CRIMINAL CODE

§ 76-2-303.

Entrapment

(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or a person directed by or acting in
cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to
obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready
to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an
offense does not constitute entrapment.
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is
based on conduct causing or threatening the injury to a person other than the
person perpetrating the entrapment.
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even though the actor
denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute the offense.
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear evidence on
the issue and shall determine as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant
was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall be made at
least ten days before trial except the court for good cause shown may permit a
later filing.
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it shall
dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the court determines the defendant was
not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury at trial.
Any order by the court dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be
appealable by the state.
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the defense of entrapment is
an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall not be admitted except that in a
trial where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his past convictions for
felonies and any testimony given by the defendant at a hearing on entrapment
may be used to impeach his testimony at trial.
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